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FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS: HOW REGULATIONS CAN RESTORE PUBLIC 
TRUST IN THE MEDIA 
    Sarah Clemens* 
Journalists face a credibility crisis, plagued by chants of fake news 
and a crowded rat race in the primetime ratings. Critics of the media look at 
journalists as the problem. Within this domain, legal scholarship has 
generated a plethora of pieces critiquing media credibility with less attention 
devoted to how and why public trust of the media has eroded. This Note offers 
a novel explanation and defense. To do so, it asserts the proposition that 
deregulating the media contributed to the proliferation of fake news and led 
to a decline in public trust of the media. To support this claim, this Note first 
briefly examines the historical underpinnings of the regulations that once 
made television broadcasters “public trustees” of the news. This Note also 
touches on the historical role of the Public Broadcasting Act that will serve 
as the legislative mechanism under which media regulations can be amended.  
Delving into what transpired as a result of deregulation and prodding 
the effects of limiting oversight over broadcast, this Note analyzes the current 
public perception of broadcast news, putting forth the hypothesis that 
deregulation is correlated to a negative public perception of broadcast news. 
This Note analyzes the effect of deregulation by exploring recent examples of 
what has emerged as a result of deregulation, including some of the most 
significant examples of misinformation in recent years. In so doing, it 
discusses reporting errors that occurred ahead of the Iraq War, analyzes how 
conspiracy theories spread in mainstream broadcast, and discusses the effect 
of partisan reporting on public perception of the media.  
Finally, this Note proposes creating an Independent Broadcast 
Council under the regulatory authority of the Federal Communications 
Commission that would oversee the reintroduction of a revised Fairness 
Doctrine using the existing statutory framework from the Public 
Broadcasting Act. Lastly, this Note addresses the implications of 
reimplementing regulations on the media, including addressing the First 
Amendment counterarguments as well as U.S. Supreme Court and court of 
appeals cases that suggest courts would uphold this proposal.  
                                                 
* 2019-2020 Deputy Managing Editor, Concordia Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Concordia 
University School of Law, 2021. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[W]herever the people are well informed they can be trusted with 
their own government.”1  For Americans, broadcast news remains the most 
popular source from which to receive that information.2 As a source of 
information to the American public, the importance of media credibility 
cannot be overstated. A public informed by objective facts can make educated 
decisions based upon those facts.  
When the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began 
licensing broadcast television stations, it did so under the premise that 
broadcasters were “public trustees” who had the privilege and responsibility 
of using public airwaves to inform the public.3 This model and regulatory 
scheme ushered in half a century of public confidence in not only broadcast, 
but in the men and woman who provided the news.4 Yet, beginning with the 
FCC’s decision to abandon the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, broadcast 
underwent a significant deregulatory process throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
that eliminated many assurances the public had that information was fair and 
balanced.5  
Public perception of media credibility in the United States reached its 
lowest level in polling history in 2016.6 Almost two-thirds of Americans 
                                                 
1 Thomas Jefferson to Richard Price, THE LIBRARY OF CONG. (Jan. 8, 1789), 
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/jefferson/60.html. 
2 Rick Edmonds, Pew Research Finds That Broadcast is the Favorite Source for Local News, 
POYNTER (March 26, 2019), https://www.poynter.org/business-work/2019/pew-research-
finds-that-broadcast-is-the-favorite-source-for-local-news-and-weather-is-the-most-valued-
topic/.  According to a survey of 35,000 adults released by the Pew Research Center, thirty-
eight percent of adults receive their news from broadcast television compared to twenty-two 
percent from radio and seventeen percent from the daily newspaper. Id.  
3 Priscilla Regan, Reviving the Public Trustee Concept and Applying it to Information 
Privacy Policy, 76 MD. L. REV. 1025, 1031 (2017). 
4 See generally DRAFT Chapter 3: The New Media Landscape, MEDIUM (June 27, 2018), 
https://medium.com/trust-media-and-democracy/draft-chapter-3-the-new-media-landscape-
4a3e8a89b661#05c9 [hereinafter The New Media Landscape].  In the mid-20th Century, 
with the rise of broadcast television and the implementation of the Fairness Doctrine, the 
definition of “news” was clear and there was less disagreement about what a “fact” was, but 
once the Fairness Doctrine was repealed the agreement began to disintegrate. Id. Trust in 
media began to erode as the line blurred between news reporting and news analysis. Id.  
5 See infra Part I.  For a scholarly discussion on the possibility of extending regulations to 
cable news, which is beyond the scope of this Note, see Nareissa L. Smith, Consumer 
Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas: A Proposal to Extend the News Distortion Doctrine 
to Cable Television News Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 223, 228 (2015).  
6 Art Swift, Americans’ Trust in Mass Media Sinks to New Low, GALLUP (Sept. 14, 2016), 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/195542/americans-trust-mass-media-sinks-new-low.aspx. 
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believe that the media publishes fake news.7 Moreover, the perception of 
media credibility divides sharply among party lines.8 This perception of fake 
news was bolstered in recent years by a politician who calls the press “the 
enemy of the people.”9 “The Fake News Media has NEVER been more 
Dishonest or Corrupt than it is right now. There has never been a time like 
this in American History . . . Fake News is the absolute Enemy of the People 
and our Country itself!”10 Nonetheless, the issue of credibility in the media 
transcends a political campaign or presidency. Though the reason for a 
decline in public perception of the media is varied, this Note proposes that 
regulating broadcast news would fundamentally contribute to a decline in the 
perception that the media is fake news by increasing accuracy and 
transparency in broadcast media.11  
In the current regulatory environment, broadcast news is no longer 
under an obligation to provide contrasting viewpoints or discuss issues of 
public importance, though such a requirement was once a prerequisite to a 
broadcast license.12 Despite challenges to its constitutionality, the Supreme 
Court upheld the requirement.13 Moreover, existing legislation that created 
an independent corporation to uphold programming standards for viewers 
extended only to educational stations but was never intended to regulate 
broadcast news.14  
This Note asserts the proposition that deregulating the media 
                                                 
7 Ian Buchanan, The Media’s Credibility Crisis, THE CHRONICLE (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:00 PM), 
https://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2017/09/the-medias-credibility-crisis (The data from 
the poll comes from a Harvard-Harris poll provided exclusively to The Hill); See also 
Jonathan Easley, Poll: Majority Says Mainstream Media Publishes Fake News, THE HILL 
(May 24, 2017, 10:10 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/334897-poll-majority-
says-mainstream-media-publishes-fake-news. 
8 Buchanan, supra note 7 (highlighting a 2016 Gallup poll showed that Democrats’ and 
Independents’ trust in the media decreased slightly while Republicans attribute unfair and 
negative coverage of Donald Trump to a sharp decline in trust, reaching only fourteen 
percent).  
9 Stephanie Sugars, From Fake News to Enemy of the People: An Anatomy of Trump’s 
Tweets, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Jan. 30, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://cpj.org 
/blog/2019/01/trump-twitter-press-fake-news-enemy-people.php. 
10 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), TWITTER (March 19, 2019, 5:24 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1107981131012628481?lang=en (capitalization 
emphasis in original). 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part I.A. 
13 See infra Part I.B. 
14 See infra Part I.C.  
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contributed to the proliferation of fake news and led to a decline in public 
trust of the media. It asserts that to combat these issues and restore 
broadcasters to the role of “public trustees,” the government must 
reimplement a modern-day version of the Fairness Doctrine. To do so, this 
Note proposes creating an Independent Broadcast Council, independent of 
partisan politics, with a central focus of guaranteeing that broadcasters 
uphold their role as public trustees. It does so under framework consistent 
with existing law.15  
Moreover, this Note proposes that amending the existing Public 
Broadcasting Act to expand the scope of legislation to encompass broadcast 
news and incorporate the key tenets of the Fairness Doctrine would 
significantly improve public perception of the media.16 The revised 
legislation would define the term fake news and warn consumers when it aired 
by creating a rating system.17  
This Note proceeds in three Parts. Part I lays out the historical 
background of broadcast regulation in the United States. In so doing, it 
examines the key legislative and judicial decisions that led to the current 
regulatory environment. Part II analyzes the premise of fake news and how it 
contributes to negative public perception of the media before evaluating three 
recent examples of circumstances in which the media portrayed stories in a 
biased or factually unclear way that materially contributed to a decline in 
public trust. Part III introduces the proposal for an Independent Broadcast 
Council and identifies the framework under which the council would 
function. Moreover, it analyzes the three examples discussed in Part II under 
the context of the newly proposed guidelines to hypothesize how the 
reporting may have led to a different outcome had the council had an 
oversight role. Finally, Part III examines how these regulations have 
succeeded in other countries and shows how a current Supreme Court would 
likely hold on challenges raised against the regulations by reconciling two 
cases.   
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND   
This Part draws on historical research to trace the deregulation of 
broadcast television. Along the way, it reveals the genesis of the Fairness 
                                                 
15 See infra Part III.A.  
16 See infra Part III.B. 
17 See infra Part III.B.   
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Doctrine and the Public Broadcast Act. In so doing, this Note evaluates the 
repercussions of deregulating the broadcast industry and examines how 
courts and legislatures have struggled to balance the First Amendment 
guarantee of free speech against the public trustee obligations that broadcast 
media were once entrusted with to provide fair and balanced coverage.  
A. An Era of Broadcast Regulation  
The history of broadcast regulation in the United States is intricate 
and multifaceted. Even so, the evolution of the agencies charged with 
overseeing broadcast follows a relatively linear path. This Subpart provides 
an abbreviated history of broadcast regulation to help aid understanding about 
why certain regulations failed, why others succeeded, and what transpired as 
the result of deregulation.  
 The Radio Act of 1912 was the first act of legislation that required 
licenses for radio stations.18 The Act’s passage occurred following 
government concern that radio interference had contributed to a delay in the 
rescue of passengers on the Titanic the night it sank.19 At the time of the 
Radio Act, the Commerce Department monitored radio, but with 
technological advances the government recognized a need for a regulatory 
body that could respond to the unique demands of radio at the time.20 Shortly 
thereafter, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.21 This revised legislation 
established the Federal Radio Commission, but by 1934 the regulatory body 
was supplanted by the Federal Communications Commission.22  
A review of early legislation reveals the concern many in Congress 
had with the advent of television and radio and the potential this new 
technology possessed as a political tool.23 Texas Representative Luther 
Johnson shared his concerns ahead of a debate on the Radio Act of 1927: 
                                                 
18 H.R. REP. NO. 741 (1912), https://www.visitthecapitol.gov/exhibitions/artifact/s-6412-act-
regulate-radio-communication-radio-act-1912-may-20-1912. 
19 Id. 
20 Jennifer Davis, Anniversary of the Radio Act of 1927, The Beginning of Broadcast 
Regulation, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Feb. 23, 2016), https://blogs.loc.gov/law/2016/02 
/anniversary-of-the-radio-act-of-1927-the-beginning-of-broadcast-regulation/. 
21 Act of Feb. 23, 1927, Ch. 169; 44 Stat. 1162.  
22 See 47 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1996). 
23 But see Rebecca Ruiz, Reaction to Regulation: 1934 vs. Today, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 
2015, 6:32 PM), https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/reaction-to-regulation-1934-vs-
today/ (describing the reaction two senators had in 1934 to the proposed passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934, calling the legislation “overreaching” and an attempt to 
“censor the press”). 
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American thought and American politics will be largely at the 
mercy of those who operate these stations, for publicity is the 
most powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic.  
And when such a weapon is placed in the hands of one person, 
or a single selfish group is permitted to either tacitly or 
otherwise acquire ownership or dominate these broadcasting 
stations throughout the country, then woe be to those who dare 
to differ with them. It will be impossible to compete with them 
in reaching the ears of the American people.24 
The FCC emerged out of the Communications Act of 1934.25 At that time, 
broadcast television was in its infancy, and the FCC was created to regulate 
and expand the availability of communication to people across the United 
States.26  
The premise behind the Communications Act was simple: those who 
wished to broadcast on television or radio could do so only with a license, 
and Congress required that the FCC grant a license only to those who would 
serve the public interest.27 To comply with this responsibility, the FCC 
showed a preference toward granting and renewing licenses to stations that 
presented more than one view.28 That said, what began as a preference by the 
FCC evolved into a mandate after it published the report In the Matter of 
Editorializing by the Broadcast Licensees.29 As a result, the guidelines that 
would govern broadcasters for nearly 40 years became known as the Fairness 
Doctrine.30  
The Fairness Doctrine had two primary requirements for a 
broadcaster to obtain a license. First, “every licensee [must] devote a 
                                                 
24 Steve Rendall, The Fairness Doctrine: How We Lost it and Why We Need it Back, 
SISYPHUS (July 2018), https://sisyphuslitmag.org/2018/07/the-fairness-doctrine-how-we-
lost-it-and-why-we-need-it-back/. 
25 Id. (stating that the purpose of the Communications Act was to “regulat[e] interstate and 
foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as 
possible, to all the people of the United States”). 
26 Id. 
27 47 U.S.C.A. § 307 (2004). 
28 See Kathleen Ann Ruane, Fairness Doctrine: History and Constitutional Issues, CONG. 
RES. SERV (2011). 
29 See Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d REP. 1246, 1246–70 (1949).  The 
report was first iteration of the Fairness Doctrine, which set out the requirements for 
broadcasters to devote time to controversial issues and air opposing views. Id. 
30 Id. at 1264 (referring to the guidelines as “the doctrine of fairness.”). 
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reasonable portion of broadcast time to the discussion and consideration of 
controversial issues of public importance.”31 Second, “in doing so [the 
broadcaster be] fair—that is, that [the broadcaster] affirmatively endeavor to 
make. . . facilities available for the expression of contrasting viewpoints held 
by responsible elements with respect to the controversial issues presented.”32  
Additional requirements under the Fairness Doctrine were later 
imposed, including the “personal attack rule” which required broadcasters to 
notify a person who was the subject of a personal attack within one week and 
required the broadcaster to allow the individual an opportunity to respond on 
air.33 The regulation also required broadcasters that endorsed a political 
candidate to allow other candidates an equal opportunity to respond.34  
The premise of the Fairness Doctrine was based on the concept that 
television broadcasters were “public trustees.”35 Unlike newspapers, the 
airwaves for broadcast television were believed to be finite.36 This “scarcity 
concept” meant that broadcasters who used the public airwaves should 
provide a public service.37 Because the federal government licensed 
broadcasters, the theory was that the networks should air competing 
perspectives designed to foster a fair debate on controversial issues.38  
In many ways, it is unsurprising the Fairness Doctrine emerged in 
1949. The political and media landscape in the United States in the early 
1950s bred an atmosphere of distrust among the American public, and for the 
first time in American history, the coverage played out live across television.  
In the early 1950s, Americans were told to fear Communism—to be 
                                                 
31 Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public 
Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10426 (1964).  
32 Id. (original punctuation preserved).  
33 47 C.F.R. § 73.123–73.300 (1974). 
34 Id. (articulating that though the Fairness Doctrine required broadcasters to provide equal 
time to other candidates if the station endorsed a candidate, the rule was separate from the 
Equal Time rule which is still in effect); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1941 (1994).  
35 See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973) 
(“[L]icensee’s role developed in terms of a ‘public trustee’ charged with the duty of fairly 
and impartially informing the public audience.”). 
36 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); see also Josephine Soriano, The 
Digital Transition and the First Amendment: Is It Time to Reevaluate Red Lion’s Scarcity 
Rationale? 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L. J. 341, 343 (2006) (explaining that broadcast media uses 
electromagnetic spectrum to transmit signal, and there are a limited number of signals that 
can occupy the spectrum). 
37 John W. Berresford, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating Traditional Broadcasting: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Past, 2 MEDIA BUREAU STAFF RES. PAPER (2005). 
38 See Ruane, supra note 28.  
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watchful of their neighbors, their teachers, their news anchors.39 The Red 
Scare and Cold War dominated nightly news in the late 1940s and early 
1950s.40 Despite the rampant fear that swept across the nation and consumed 
the public and public figures alike, Americans largely trusted broadcast 
news.41 Perhaps this is why when Edward R. Murrow, a renowned and 
respected journalist for CBS, spoke on March 9, 1954, on his television 
program See it Now and warned against the dangers of McCarthyism, the 
audience listened.42 In this broadcast, Murrow looked directly into the camera 
and condemned McCarthy and his claim of rampant Communism:  
We proclaim ourselves, as indeed we are, the defenders of 
freedom—what's left of it but we cannot defend freedom 
abroad by deserting it at home. The actions of the junior 
Senator from Wisconsin have caused alarm and dismay 
amongst our allies abroad and given considerable comfort to 
our enemies. And whose fault is that? Not really his. He didn't 
create this situation of fear. He merely exploited it, and rather 
successfully. Cassius was right: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not 
in our stars, but [i]n ourselves.”43 
The more illustrative point to Edward R. Murrow’s speech condemning 
Joseph McCarthy during the infamous See it Now broadcast is not that the 
American public listened,44 though they did, but that in spite of the fear and 
distrust in America at that time, people trusted the news.45 Moreover, Murrow 
and others like him could speak out against Communism, the Vietnam War, 
                                                 
39 Landor Storrs, McCarthyism and the Second Red Scare, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
AM. HIST. 1 (July 2015). 
40 Id.  
41 See The New Media Landscape, supra note 4. 
42 Joseph Wershba, Murrow v. McCarthy: See it Now, N.Y. TIMES (March 4, 1979), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/04/archives/murrow-vs-mccarthy-see-it-now.html. 
43 Id. 
44 Id.  Following Murrow’s address to the country, CBS said it received the largest response 
in broadcast history from the American public: 12,348 phone calls within a few hours. 
Though McCarthy’s reputation had begun to decline, Murrow’s public address is largely 
credited with demonstrating the role that television journalism once had in shaping American 
society. See Edward Walsh, When Television Took on Joe McCarthy, WASH. POST (March 
11, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/ 1994/03/11/when-television-
took-on-joe-mccarthy/46f3f817-b0a8-432f-8c68-db4f906a5b01/. 
45 See  Edward  R. Murrow, FILM  &  HISTORY  (June  20,  2016),  http://www.uwosh.edu/ 
filmandhistory/documentary/americanhistory1/murrow.php (referring to Edward R. Murrow 
at the time of McCarthy broadcast as “the most trusted man in America”). 
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and culturally significant events in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s without 
violating the Fairness Doctrine.  
Even so, some have argued that the Fairness Doctrine chilled free 
speech;46 this was and remains the primary motive for its repeal.47 Yet the 
Supreme Court has never held that the Fairness Doctrine was unconstitutional 
or contravened the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.48 In part, this is 
because of the medium.  
The FCC licenses broadcasters to use the airwaves, and though they 
have the right to speak, the right is confined by the mechanism.49 Yet a wave 
of challenges and policy concerns throughout the 1980s would ultimately 
lead the FCC to abandon the Doctrine, and with it, the ideal that broadcasters 
had a responsibility to serve as public trustees.  
B. Challenging Constitutionality 
In 1985, the FCC issued a report entitled the 1985 Fairness Report.50 
The report was published as an evaluation of the Fairness Doctrine.51 The 
Commission concluded that the “fairness doctrine . . . disserve[d] the public 
interest.”52 The FCC also concluded that the second prong of the Doctrine, 
which required broadcasters to air opposing viewpoints, had a chilling effect 
on news coverage.53 Even so, the Commission did not repeal the Doctrine 
after that conclusion because the FCC was under the mistaken assumption 
that the Doctrine had been codified in a 1959 amendment to Title 47 of the 
United States Code, section 315.54  
                                                 
46 See Adam Thierer, Why the Fairness Doctrine is Anything But Fair, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Oct. 29, 1993), https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/why-
the-fairness-doctrine-anything-fair (arguing that the Fairness Doctrine put too much 
regulatory power under FCC control and allowed for arbitrary enforcement); see also Robert 
Mulholland, The Fairness Doctrine is Unfair to the Public, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (May 30, 
1989), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1989-05-30-8902050312-story.html 
(suggesting that the Fairness Doctrine allowed the government to control what content a 
station aired).  
47 Ruane, supra note 28, at 5. 
48 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
49 See infra Part I.B. (highlighting in the subsequent court decisions the court’s rationale in 
determining that broadcast is different than print media).  
50 102 F.C.C.2d REP. 145 (1985).  
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 148.  
53 Id. at 155. 
54 See Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1959). In 1959, Congress amended the 
Communications Act of 1934. Congress revised section 315 to include language that stated 
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Yet, the report, critical of the Fairness Doctrine and suggestive of its 
negative implications on the First Amendment, set the stage for a series of 
court challenges that ultimately empowered the FCC to repeal it in 1987.55  
1. Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc., v. FCC 
Before the FCC’s abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine in 1987, the 
policies that governed broadcast licenses for the second half of the twentieth 
century faced intense scrutiny in the courts.56 Yet, in 1969, the Supreme 
Court demonstrated it was willing to uphold the principles behind the 
Fairness Doctrine.57 Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc. v. FCC involved two cases 
that challenged the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine and the statutory 
basis that had supported it.58  
The case centered on a man named Fred J. Cook who had authored a 
book entitled Goldwater—Extremist on the Right.59 Red Lion Broadcasting 
was licensed to operate a radio station, and the station broadcast a segment 
by Reverend Billy James Hargis that discussed Cook’s book.60 During the 
broadcast, Hargis made a series of allegations against Cook, including 
alleging that he had been fired for making false statements, that he worked 
for a publication associated with Communism, that he attacked the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and that his book was an attempt to destroy Berry 
Goldwater.61  
                                                 
a broadcaster shall afford a reasonable opportunity to discuss conflicting views. That said, 
the FCC relied on a D.C. Circuit Court decision, Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 
806 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir.1986), which stated, “[h]ad Congress affirmatively intended to 
make the fairness doctrine a statutory command, it surely would have employed a more direct 
and less offhanded approach…” Id. at 1119. The dissent strongly maintained that the Fairness 
Doctrine had been codified, stating, “[a]s Judge Robinson explained for the court, ‘[the] 
language placed in Section 315(a) in 1959. . . codifies the fairness doctrine formulated by 
the Commission in 1949.’ Kennedy for President Committee v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432, 438 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 377–78, 89 S. Ct. at 1799–1800).” Id. at 1117. 
Even so, the FCC elected to discontinue adherence to the Doctrine determining that it was 
never codified.  
55 See In re Syracuse Peace Counsel, 2 FCC RCD. 5043, 5050 (1987). 
56 See Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (declining to reverse the ruling of 
the FCC that rejected a complaint by groups under the fairness doctrine); Banzhaf v. FCC, 
405 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (affirming a ruling by the FCC to requiring television 
and radio stations to devote equal airtime to present a case against cigarette smoking). 
57 See generally Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  
58 Id. at 370.  
59 Id. at 371. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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After the broadcast, Cook sought to invoke his free reply time, 
determining he had been personally attacked on air.62 Despite the FCC policy 
mandating the air time, Red Lion refused.63 Following an exchange between 
Cook, Red Lion, and the FCC, the FCC determined that Cook was entitled to 
a chance to respond.64  
The Supreme Court went through an exhaustive history of the 
Doctrine and detailed the legislative intent behind it.65 The Court reasoned 
that the Fairness Doctrine was a “legitimate exercise of congressionally 
delegated authority” to the FCC.66 Specifically, the Court addressed the First 
Amendment issues raised by broadcasters and the contention that the First 
Amendment protected broadcaster’s right to exclude who they choose from 
the broadcast, holding that no person can be prevented from publishing what 
he thinks and that such a right extends equally to broadcasters.67  
Yet it was this comparison of broadcast to other mediums of 
publication in an argument of First Amendment protection in which the Court 
disagreed.68 There were differences in how the First Amendment applied to 
the medium of broadcast, the Court determined.69 The Court pointed to the 
government’s ability to limit sound-amplifying equipment, but suggested that 
in so doing, the government was not impeding free speech.70  
Underpinning the Court’s rationale behind Red Lion was the scarcity 
argument:71  
If 100 persons want broadcast licenses but there are only 10 
frequencies to allocate, all of them may have the same ‘right’ 
to a license; but if there is to be any effective communication 
by radio, only a few can be licensed and the rest must be barred 
from the airwaves.72  
                                                 
62 Id. at 372; see also In re Amendment of Part 73, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, 722 (1967) (highlight 
that the FCC codified its longstanding personal attack and political editorial rules which 
allowed a person to invoke airtime in the context of the discussion of a controversial issue if 
a personal attack occurred). 
63 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 372. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 375–387. 
66 Id. at 385. 
67 Id. at 386. 
68 Id. at 387.  
69 Id. 
70 Id. (citing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
71 Id. at 388–89. 
72 Id. 
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Moreover, the Court determined it was “the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters,” that was important.73 In its reasoning, the 
Court acknowledged that the FCC could have required broadcasters to share 
the frequencies.74 Instead, the Court recognized that the government elected 
to bestow upon the broadcasters selected for a license a responsibility to act 
as a public trustee—a requirement that in exchange for the free use of public 
airwaves, the licensee would offer reasonable time to those with a different 
view or those who had been publicly attacked.75 The Court reasoned that the 
First Amendment granted no right to a licensee that enabled them to prevent 
others from speaking on the broadcast and granted no unconditional use of a 
resource to which others had been denied access.76  
The Court emphasized the use of licenses in its Red Lion opinion to 
uphold the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine. “Licenses to broadcast 
do not confer ownership of designated frequencies, but only the temporary 
privilege of using them.”77 The Red Lion Court upheld the constitutionality 
of the Fairness Doctrine, 78 and held that the FCC’s regulations in the 
Doctrine were authorized by statute and the Constitution.79 Though the 
Court’s decision has never been directly challenged, subsequent appellate 
decisions undermined its rationale.  
2. Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC 
In 1986, a case called Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC 
(TRAC) came before the United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit.80 
Judge Robert Bork and future Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia 
questioned the legitimacy of the Fairness Doctrine in the opinion.81 The 
decision, written by Judge Bork, challenged the Supreme Court to “one day 
revisit this area of law and either eliminate the distinction between print and 
broadcast media . . . or announce a constitutional distinction that is more 
usable than the present one.”82  
                                                 
73 Id. at 390 (emphasis added). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 391. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 394 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1934)). 
78 Id. at 396. 
79 Id. at 401. 
80 See generally Telecom. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
81 See generally id.  
82 Id. at 509.  
232                          Concordia Law Review                               Vol. 5 
 
The case centered on a challenge to the FCC’s decision not to apply 
the regulations of the Fairness Doctrine to a technology known as teletext.83 
The FCC argued that the Fairness Doctrine should not extend to a technology 
that did not exist when the Doctrine was created and maintained that applying 
the Doctrine was at the sole discretion of the Commission.84 The FCC also 
argued that teletext was a hybrid of print and broadcast, which did not subject 
it to the scarcity rationale outlined in Red Lion.85  
Unlike Red Lion, which was concerned exclusively with broadcast, 
the FCC sought to distinguish the argument in TRAC by claiming that 
regulating teletext implicated the First Amendment because it regulated print 
media, which the Court had determined in a prior decision was not subject to 
right-of-reply.86 The FCC attempted to differentiate teletext from broadcast 
in TRAC by arguing that textual media, unlike airwaves, was not scarce. 
However, that argument was unconvincing to the D.C. Circuit.  
The court determined that “[t]he dispositive fact is that teletext is 
transmitted over broadcast frequencies that the Supreme Court has ruled 
scarce and this makes teletext's content regulable.”87 Though the FCC lost the 
appeal,88 the court struck the first major blow to the Doctrine by holding that 
the Doctrine was not statutory law, but rather was created by the FCC and as 
such, could be repealed by the FCC.89 This was the first recognition that the 
Doctrine had not been codified. 
3. Meredith Corp. v. FCC 
The FCC’s last barrier to eliminating the Fairness Doctrine was 
removed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals the next year in Meredith Corp 
v. FCC.90 A station owned by Meredith Corp. was accused of violating the 
Fairness Doctrine for refusing to allow response time to a public attack.91 
                                                 
83 Id. at 502 (noting that teletext was a new technology that transmitted graphics onto 
television screens for home viewing). 
84 Id. at 504. 
85 See id. 
86 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (striking down a statute 
that applied to newspapers requiring editorial columns to provide a right to reply).  
87 Telecom. Research and Action Ctr., 801 F.2d at 508.  
88 Id. at 502.  
89 Id. at 517. 
90 See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987).  
91 Id. at 865–66.  
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Concurrent to the case, the FCC’s Fairness Report was issued.92 The report 
concluded that the Doctrine did not serve the public interest, but the 
Commission failed to repeal the Doctrine at that time.93 The D.C. Circuit 
questioned the Commission’s unwillingness to declare where it stood on the 
policies that had long governed broadcasters:  
[T]he Commission refused to decide whether the fairness 
doctrine was self-generated pursuant to its general 
congressional authorization or specifically mandated by 
Congress. Of course, the fair inference to be drawn from the 
Commission's report was that the Commission believed the 
doctrine was not specifically mandated; otherwise, it would 
have been irresponsible for the Commission gratuitously to 
cast constitutional doubt on a congressional command. 
Nonetheless, because the Commission felt intense political, if 
not legal, pressure from Congress, it chose not to reach a final 
conclusion regarding the origins of the doctrine. We think, 
however, the Commission was obliged to resolve that issue, at 
least in the context of an enforcement proceeding in which a 
party raises a constitutional defense.94 
The D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case to the FCC to consider the 
constitutional arguments, noting, “the Commission need not confront that 
issue if it concludes that in light of its Fairness Report it may not or should 
not enforce the doctrine because it is contrary to the public interest.”95  
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Red Lion, once the Fairness 
Report was published, the FCC elected to stop enforcing the Doctrine under 
the Reagan administration in 1987.96 That year, Congress voted to codify the 
regulations embodied in the Doctrine, but Reagan vetoed the measure, stating 
“[t]his type of content-based regulation by the federal government is, in my 
judgment, antagonistic to the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”97  
                                                 
92 See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F.C.C.2d REP. 145 (1985).  
93 See supra Part I.B. 
94 Meredith Corp., 809 F.2d at 872–73. 
95 Id. at 874.  
96 Tim Dickinson, So Long, Fairness Doctrine, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 24, 2011, 6:11 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/ politics/politics-news/so-long-fairness-doctrine-75444/. 
97 Penny Pagano, Reagan’s Veto Kills Fairness Doctrine Bill, L.A. TIMES (June 21, 1987, 
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The political landscape of broadcast networks changed almost 
immediately. According to the Media Access Project, after the repeal of the 
Fairness Doctrine there has been less coverage of issues; television news had 
decreased locally and nationally.98 The Federal Communications Law 
Journal determined that 25 percent of broadcast stations no longer offer any 
local news or public affairs programming.99 But more disconcerting is the 
proliferation of partisan reporting. Less than a year after the FCC abolished 
the Fairness Doctrine, Rush Limbaugh launched his talk radio show, 
polarizing talk radio.100 Rising out of the demise of the Doctrine are names 
such as Sean Hannity and Bill O’Reilly.101  
C. A New Standard of Regulation: Public Broadcasting Act  
Whereas most of the legislation addressed in Part I of this Note is in 
reference to repealed regulations, this Subpart addresses the passage of 
legislation that imposed regulation on broadcasters. Though seemingly 
disconnected from the Fairness Doctrine, the history of this legislation is 
critical to understanding the proposal discussed infra Part III.102  
In 1967, Congress passed Public Law 90-129 to amend the 
Communications Act of 1934.103 The amendment became known as the 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.104 The Act provided federal aid to public 
broadcasting, but more importantly, it created the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting (CPB) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS).105 The CPB 
                                                 
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-06-21-mn-8908-story.html. 
98 Rendall, supra note 24.  
99 Id.  
100 Mark Gunther, The Transformation of Network News, NIEMAN REPORTS (June 15, 1999), 
https://niemanreports.org/articles/the-transformation-of-network-news/. 
101 Id.  The demise of the Fairness Doctrine saw the emergence of major conservative voices. 
For additional discussion regarding potential reasons for this, see Nicole Hemmer, The 
Conservative War on Liberal Media Has a Long History, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/the-conservative-war-on-liberal-
media-has-a-long-history/283149/ (“Conservatives saw the media landscape differently. . . . 
Because of this, the right believed fairness did not require a response to conservative 
broadcasts; conservative broadcasts were the response. Unable to bring the FCC around to 
their position, conservatives increasingly saw the commission as a powerful government 
agency dedicated to maintaining media’s liberal tilt.”). 
102 See infra Part III.  
103 An Act of Nov. 7, 1967 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365.  
104 See Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. §§ 390–99 (1976). 
105 See id.; see also Robert Avery, Why Public Broadcasting?, NAT’L COMM. ASS’N (Oct. 1, 
2007), https://www.natcom.org/communication-currents/why-public-broadcasting. The Act 
also created National Public Radio (NPR). Id.  
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was funded by the federal government as a conduit of federal funding for the 
public media.106 The corporation functioned as an umbrella organization to 
support public media operations, but did not, and does not, operate broadcast 
stations.107 On the other hand, PBS was established under the Act as a 
membership organization to work in partnership with other stations and 
provide public programming and educational programming.108 By design, 
PBS is limited to educational programming.109  
Though the legislation was intended to create a public broadcasting 
network that rivaled the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), it had 
fundamental flaws that prevented it from ever reaching the idealism 
envisioned by drafters.110 First, the governing body of the CPB was intended 
to be nonpartisan, with the objective that the Board of Directors would protect 
the organization from political interference.111 Yet, when the Act passed, the 
legislation required a fifteen-member Board whose appointees would be 
decided by the president.112 Second, the intended funding mechanism for the 
Act did not make it into the bill.113 The result was a struggle to obtain 
congressional funding each fiscal year.114  
Despite its flaws, the Public Broadcasting Act has existed for more 
than fifty years. Since its founding, it adopted a code of integrity, code of 
ethics, and charter that govern both the media organizations overseen by the 
corporation  and the employees within the corporation.115 Members of the 
CPB adopted a charter outlining principles aimed at strengthening trust and 
integrity of the public media. The charter specifies a commitment to “[a]im 
for transparency in news gathering, reporting, and other content creation and 
share the reasons for important editorial and programming choices.”116 
                                                 
106 CPB FAQ, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, https://www.cpb.org/faq#1-2 (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2020). 
107 Id. 
108 Mission, IDAHO PUB. TELEVISION, http://www.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/mission- 
statement/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).  
109 Overview, IDAHO PUB. TELEVISION (Aug. 2018), http://www.pbs.org/about/about-pbs/ 
overview/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 





115 Ombudsman, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, https://www.cpb.org/ombudsman/about 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020).  
116 Code of Integrity, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING, http://www.codeofintegrity.org/ (last 
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Moreover, the public media seeks to “[p]romote the common good, the public 
interest, and these commitments to integrity and trustworthiness in 
organizational governance, leadership, and management.”117  
Of note, the CPB charter established the position of ombudsman as an 
independent observer of public broadcasting. The position is independent of 
the CPB and was created in 2005 as the result of a “clear need for a ‘system-
wide process of exerting upward pressure on the standards of taste and 
performance.’”118 The ombudsman works to encourage high standards in 
public broadcasting.119 The benefit of public broadcasting is difficult to 
overstate. Research shows that, unlike its commercial counterpart, the public 
news audience is better-informed120 and more likely to vote.121 The audience 
also has smaller disparities in knowledge between social groups.122 
II. REPORTING LIVE FROM THE PROBLEM 
The preceding history is crucial for understanding the current 
deregulated culture within broadcast news. More importantly, it juxtaposes 
the current media landscape and demonstrates that it was once possible for 
the public to have trust in broadcast news. Whereas big government, labor, 
and business have traditionally suffered low public opinion, the public largely 
viewed broadcast news in a positive light since its inception, finding 
broadcasters trustworthy and credible.123  
Part II of this Note examines the current scope of the issue. By first 
analyzing the concept of fake news and how that concept impacts public 
perception of the media, this Note delves into recent scenarios that meet the 
definition of fake news and examines why recent attempts to regulate the 
                                                 
visited Mar. 7, 2020) [hereinafter Code of Integrity]. 
117 Id. 
118 Charter Establishing the CPB Office of the Ombudsman, CORP. FOR PUB. BROADCASTING 
(Feb. 1, 2011), https://www.cpb.org/ombudsman/charter [hereinafter Charter].  
119 Id.  
120 See Stuart Soroka et al., Auntie Knows Best? Public Broadcasters and Current Affairs 
Knowledge, 43 B. J. POL. S. 1, 4–5 (Oct. 2013). 
121 See Susan Banducci, Holli A. Semetko, Media, Mobilization and European Elections, 
FIFTH FRAMEWORK RES. PROGRAMME (Mar. 10, 2003), http://www.ucd.ie/dempart/working 
papers/media.pdf. 
122 See James Curran et. al., Media Systems, Public Knowledge and Democracy: A 
Comparative Study, 24 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION 1, 5–26 (2009), 
https://pcl.stanford.edu/research/2008/curran-mediasystems.pdf. 
123 Confidence in Institutions, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-
institutions.aspx (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).    
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media have failed.  
A. Defining the Problem 
This Subpart explains how fake news affects public perception of the 
media and how that perception affects public trust of broadcast news. In so 
doing, it elucidates a general definition of the term fake news that serves as a 
basis from which to evaluate broadcast news stories. A general definition is 
necessary to identify stories that fall within the confines of fake news and to 
separate those that fall outside those confines.   
Examining the pervasiveness of an issue presents a challenge when 
no universal definition exists for what constitutes an instance of that issue. 
One scholar defined fake news as the “deliberate presentation of [ ] false or 
misleading claims as news, where the claims are misleading by design.”124 
Yet another study conducted a meta-analysis of 34 academic articles to define 
the term.125 The authors of the study recognized that it was clear that fake 
news “undermine[s] journalism’s legitimacy . . . .”126 Yet, the phrase fake 
news is typically not limited to circumstances in which a journalist 
“deliberately” presents false or misleading claims. This term has been 
repurposed to describe news that is unflattering or unfair.127 Even so, this is 
not to suggest that fake news is a widespread issue within the mainstream 
media. Instances of false or misleading broadcast news are rare, but they do 
occur.128 These occurrences, however isolated, compound the issue of media 
credibility.  
Perhaps more concerning is not the proliferation of fake news but the 
belief that it is so pervasive.129 Such a belief creates the same net effect: a 
distrust of the media. A study conducted by the University of South Carolina 
on the perceived effects of fake news found a “positive link between partisan 
                                                 
124 Axel Gelfert, Fake News: A Definition, 38 INFORMAL LOGIC 84, 86 (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v38i1.5068. 
125 See generally Edson Tandoc, Jr. & Zheng Lim, Richard Ling, Defining “Fake News” A 
Typology of Scholarly Definitions, 6 DIGITAL JOURNALISM 137 (Aug. 30, 2017), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2017.1360143 (categorizing fake news into six distinct 
subsets: news satire, news parody, news fabrication, photo manipulation, advertising and 
public relations, and propaganda). 
126 Id. at 147.  
127 See David Klein & Joshua Wueller, Fake News: A Legal Perspective, 20 J. INTERNET L. 
5, 6–13 (April 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2958790. 
128 See infra Part II.B.1–3.  
129 See S. M. Jang & J. K. Kim, Third Person Effects of Fake News: Fake News Regulation 
and Media Literacy Interventions, 80 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 295 (2018). 
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identity and TPP [third-party perception]. In other words, those with greater 
identity with their own partisan groups (either Republican or Democrat) 
showed greater self-other disparity over the perceived influence of fake 
news.”130 Moreover, the study’s authors concluded that the finding “leads to 
growing concerns of false consensus among partisan citizens. . . . As partisans 
tend to show this perceptual bias regarding the effect of fake news, the role 
of information providers, such as news organizations . . . should be 
highlighted as an effort of fighting fake news.”131 
In many ways, the concept of fake news is not difficult to understand. 
Extending beyond the medium of broadcast, when an individual wants an 
idea to be accurate, confirmation bias can lead the person to believe the idea 
is true. Confirmation bias refers to a psychological phenomenon in which a 
person seeks or interprets evidence in a manner that supports existing 
beliefs.132 More than seeking information that supports what a person already 
believes, people will seek out information that confirms their belief in a 
particular way.133 Moreover, people will be less likely to believe factual 
accounts that challenge a narrative dissimilar to the beliefs they hold.  
Researchers with the Annenberg School of Communication examined 
the effects of exposing listeners to one-sided news broadcasts and found that 
“[l]isteners who are exposed to more conservative talk evaluate[d] Democrats 
more negatively and Republicans more positively. . . .”134 The study sought 
to demonstrate the effect of exposure on political attitudes.135 The researchers 
determined that as exposure to a message increased, so too did the degree of 
agreement with the messenger.136 On the other hand, the researchers tried to 
correlate the same finding with listener’s knowledge, a result that a prior 
study had posited.137 The researchers concluded that knowledge of a subject 
was not as great an indicator as exposure to a one-sided message.138 Put 
                                                 
130 Id. at 299.  
131 See id.   
132 See Raymond Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 
2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998).  
133 Id. at 177.  
134 Gangheong Lee & Joseph Capella, The Effects of Political Talk Radio on Political 
Attitude Formation: Exposure Versus Knowledge, 18 POL. COMM. 369, 378 (2001), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d0ad/9c2ba66a64d25372e144a2734f230fad8031.pdf. 
135 See id. at 385.  
136 Id. at 386. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 387. 
2020                              FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS                                239 
 
another way, “when an audience is exposed to an intense, one-sided message, 
their agreement with the positions advocated increases as exposure and 
reception increase.”139  
 In the context of fake news, this suggests that a consumer who 
continually observes biased news reporting is more likely to increase the 
degree of agreement with the conclusions of that report than to seek out other 
sources of information that would provide a balanced account of the facts. It 
also suggests that reporting that challenges a view already adopted by a 
viewer is more likely to be rejected as fake news. This has occurred before, 
and the consequences are disconcerting.  
B. Fake News in the Real World  
This Subpart analyzes several disreputable instances of fake news that 
have rightly contributed to the poor public perception of the media’s 
credibility. This Subpart examines an initial story reported by a broadcaster 
and discusses the institutional failures that allowed misinformation or 
inaccurate reporting to occur. 
1. The Iraq War 
Mistakes in reporting are inevitable, but when the news reports only 
one side of the story it can create a perception of a reality that does not exist. 
Nothing in the subsequent section is meant to suggest that broadcast news 
was responsible in whole or in part for the Bush administration’s decision to 
invade Iraq. That said, it is worth theorizing how media coverage pre-Iraq 
war significantly influenced the public to support the war without evidence.  
One study conducted a content analysis of ABC, CBS, and NBC in 
the year before the United States’ invasion of Iraq. The study’s authors 
identified 1,434 stories from ABC, CBS, and NBC over a period of seven and 
a half months before the invasion.140 The study preliminarily suggested that 
Americans likely learned and formed much of their initial opinions about the 
                                                 
139 Id. at 389 (finding that Democrats and Independents developed negative attitudes toward 
Bill Clinton after listening to conservative talk radio). 
140 Danny Hayes & Matt Guardino, Whose Views Made the News? Media Coverage and the 
March to the War in Iraq,  27  POL.  COMM. 59, 66  (Feb. 3, 2010),  https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
10584600903502615 (The study used six criteria to identify stories for inclusion. Those 
criteria were: “(a) primary topical focus, (b) secondary topical focus, (c) identity of each 
source, (d) source category, (e) directional thrust of each source’s statement in relation to the 
Bush administration’s position of Iraq, and (f) directional thrust of the story as a whole.”). 
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Iraq war from broadcast news and were influenced by the coverage.141 
The coverage leading up to the invasion from ABC, CBS, and NBC 
focused heavily on Iraq’s suspected possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).142 At that time, the networks also broadcast stories about 
the level of support from the international community and aired segments 
about how likely it was the United States would succeed in its efforts against 
Iraq.143 
Among one of the most frequent criticisms of the broadcast news 
coverage of Iraq was its failure to question claims from the Bush 
administration about initial assertions that Iraq had WMD.144 Moreover, 
commentators suggest that the American public was told why the United 
States should invade Iraq, but the counter views were largely shut out. Yet, 
from a statistical perspective, the data suggests that counterpoints were 
provided adequate coverage.145 Does this suggest that the media provided fair 
and balanced coverage of the pre-Iraq war invasion? Perhaps not, because of 
who provided the divergent viewpoints.  
The scholarly study conducted by Hayes and Guardino examined the 
time broadcasters provided for contrasting views but found the issue was not 
in the time devoted to opposing views. Rather, it was that those who provided 
the opposing views carried the most persuasive tone to the segment.146  
For example, George Bush was the source for 53 percent of the quotes 
given in favor of the invasion.147 The study found that opposition to the 
invasion was largely spoken for on behalf of Iraqi officials: 19 percent of all 
quotes were from Saddam Hussein.148 Many of the other voices of opposition 
came from foreign leaders who were openly opposed to George Bush.149 
Contrast the credibility of Bush at this time to the weight the American public 
                                                 
141 Id. at 68. 
142 Id. at 69. 
143 Id.  
144 See Howard Kurtz, Media’s Failure on Iraq Still Stings, CNN (March 11, 2013, 1:29 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/opinion/kurtz-iraq-media-failure/index.html (examining the 
media’s failure to question the Bush administration on allegations that Iraq had WMD and 
suggesting that the public’s low confidence in the media stems from what occurred in 2003).  
145 Hayes & Guardino, supra note 140, at 72.  
146 Id.  
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148 Id. at 75. 
149 Id. (citing current and former European leaders, including French president Jacques 
Chirac, German chancellor Gerard Schroeder, and Russian president Vladimir Putin).  
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gave to those who spoke out against the war.150  
The content of coverage coming from ABC, NBC, and CBS at the 
time was also a subject of the study. Though the authors found that ABC did 
remain largely objective in its coverage, they also determined that CBS and 
NBC did not.151 In a review of transcripts during the time before the war, 
correspondents on both CBS and NBS portrayed a war with Iraq as inevitable 
and necessary.152 The study’s conclusions found that criticisms of network 
broadcasts were justified and that the author’s “findings support the view that 
media’s performance did not live up to the democratic standards most 
journalists hold themselves to, much less those expected by their critics.”153  
In the context of fake news, the failure by broadcasters to cover or 
provide equal and adequate coverage to opposing sides of the issue ahead of 
the U.S. invasion into Iraq contributed to the public distrust of the media. 
Broadcasters recognized early in the coverage that the U.S. would invade Iraq 
and failed to challenge the government on the rationale behind that decision. 
According to Howard Kurtz, a CNN reporter who was among the journalists 
that failed to question the Bush administration’s decisions, “[t]he low level 
of public confidence in the media has many causes, but one of them stems 
from what happened back in 2003.”154   
The media’s failure to cover the war objectively in Iraq remains one 
of the more notable illustrations of what can occur when a story’s conclusion 
is presumed, but it is not the only example. 
2. Seth Rich Conspiracy  
At the height of the 2016 presidential election, misinformation about 
both candidates was pervasive.155 Yet one fake news story seemed to gain 
more traction than others, and the story ultimately led to a lawsuit. Mathew 
                                                 
150 Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, George Bush’s approval rating 
reached its highest in Gallup history. There was widespread support among the public for a 
war on terrorism. See David Moore, Bush Job Approval Highest in Gallup History, 
Widespread Public Support for War on Terrorism, GALLUP (Sept. 24, 2001), 
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155 See Hunt Allcott & Matthew Gentzkow, Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 
Election, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 211 (2017), https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/ 
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Ingram of Columbia Journalism Review examined the origins of the Seth 
Rich conspiracy story, which alleged that the young Democratic National 
Committee staff member killed in a botched robbery was actually 
assassinated by a contract killer working for Hillary Clinton.156 The origins 
of the conspiracy are difficult to trace, but have largely been attributed to the 
Internet Research Agency, a Russian entity that disseminated propaganda in 
the U.S. during the 2016 campaign.157 Unlike other stories that were 
circulated in 2016, the alleged assassination of Seth Rich grew into a 
conspiracy, in part, because it entered mainstream news. A local Fox affiliate 
broadcast the story and claimed it had confirmed the details that had 
previously only circulated online. The story resulted in a lawsuit.158  
Ed Butowsky brought a claim for disparagement and conspiracy 
against National Public Radio (NPR) and David Folkenflik.159 The claim also 
centered on the local Fox News affiliate—Fox 5 DC.160 Butowsky was an 
expert in the financial services industry and made frequent appearances on 
television and radio.161 In 2017, Butowsky contacted the family of Seth Rich 
and offered to help the family solve their son’s murder; he offered money to 
hire a private investigator.162 Later, Butowsky contacted a man named Rod 
Wheeler to see if he would be willing to investigate the murder on behalf of 
the Rich family.163 In March 2017, Wheeler appeared on the local Fox 
affiliate to discuss his theory behind Rich’s death, including his theory that 
Rich may have been planning to hand documents about Hillary Clinton over 
to Wikileaks.164  
Following Wheeler’s appearance on Fox 5, he remained in contact 
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163 Butowsky, 2019 WL 2518833, at *3. 
164 Id. at *4. 
2020                              FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS                                243 
 
with a reporter for the broadcast network, at one point alleging in an email: 
“I’m ready to say that Seth’s [sic] Death was not a botched robbery and there 
appears to be a coverup within the D.C. Gov’t related to his death.”165 
According to the court filings, the Fox 5 reporter remembered that Wheeler 
was in contact with the Rich family and had expressed interest in exploring 
the story.166 On May 15, 2017, Wheeler told a different reporter with Fox 5 
that there were various sources within the FBI that had linked Rich to 
WikiLeaks: “Absolutely, yeah, and that’s confirmed.”167 The next day, Fox 
5 published a story on its website called, “Seth Rich, slain DNC staff, had 
contact with Wikileaks, say multiple sources.”168 
Within a day, the conspiracy theory became widely publicized and 
circulated. The cable news shows Fox & Friends aired two segments based 
on the Fox 5 report.169 Despite the story being discredited within hours, Fox 
allowed the story to remain published.170 Newt Gingrich, a Fox contributor 
on the cable network, spoke on air about the story. Sean Hannity similarly 
discussed the story and promoted it on his radio program despite requests 
from the family of Seth Rich to cease speaking about their son.171  
In the aftermath of the reporting, Wheeler claimed Fox had taken him 
out of context and published an incomplete version of what he said.172 More 
importantly, the reporters responsible for the misinformation continue to 
report at Fox News—one now works as a managing editor for the online 
publication.173  
Unlike the coverage of the Iraq war, which demonstrated how fake 
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news can occur in biased or one-sided reporting, the story of Seth Rich 
presents a different type of fake news. The reporting on the conspiracy theory 
behind Seth Rich’s murder represented disinformation, and more 
importantly, disinformation by a foreign government.174   
3. Sinclair Broadcast Group  
The preceding Subparts address individual stories that demonstrate 
what transpires when the media lacks objectivity or accuracy in reporting. 
Those Subparts show the variances in fake news, from biased reporting to 
disseminating disinformation. Yet sometimes this issue transcends a singular 
broadcast or event. This Subpart addresses the results when the network itself 
lacks objectivity in its reporting, affecting all stories the network reports.  
In December 2017, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
and requested comments on a rule that would affect the maximum national 
audience of television broadcast licensees.175 Sinclair Broadcast Group 
submitted comments in support of eliminating the national ownership cap.176 
Throughout most of the 20th century, regulation would have prevented 
Sinclair from reaching its current size; Sinclair Broadcast Group already 
owned 200 local television stations in 100 markets.177  
Under a prior FCC rule called the “rule of seven,” broadcast stations 
were prohibited from owning more than seven AM stations, FM stations, and 
TV stations in a single market.178 The rule of seven was adopted in 1953 to 
promote diversity among broadcast ownership, but the number increased to 
                                                 
174 WikiLeaks has long been identified as a conduit to the Russian government, whether 
wittingly or unwittingly. See Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian 
Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, U.S. DEPT. JUST. 1, 4 (March 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf (“The GRU later released additional materials 
through the organization WikiLeaks.”).  
175 FCC, MB DOCKET NO. 17-318, AMENDMENT OF SECTION 73.3555(E) OF THE 
COMMISSION’S RULES, NATIONAL TELEVISION MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP RULE, (proposed Dec. 
18, 2017); see also National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3661-02, 
WL 555423 (Jan. 26, 2018). 
176 FCC, MB Docket No. 17-318, Amendment of Section 73.3555(e) of the Commission’s 
Rules, National Television Multiple Ownership Rule, Comments of Sinclair Broadcast 
Group, (March 19, 2018). 
177 Alvin Chang, Sinclair’s Takeover of Local News, in One Striking Map, VOX (Apr. 6, 
2018, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/6/17202824/sinclair-tribune-map. 
178 Alex Jones, FCC Raises Limit on Total Stations Under One Owner, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 
1984),   https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/27/business/fcc-raises-limit-on-total-stations- 
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12 stations in 1984 to increase media competition.179 The 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 further eroded the limitation.180 Even so, 
competition and diversity never arose after a relaxation on broadcast 
ownership; instead, it led to media monopolies.181 
In 2017, Sinclair Broadcast Group required local news anchors on 
each of its 193 stations to recite from the same script on air.182 The unusual 
nature of the segment extended beyond the words spoken in unison across 
193 markets. The segment was peculiar because it was produced to appear 
sincere, as though the evening news anchor was sharing his or her earnest 
belief about the dangers of fake news. A portion of the segment that aired 
stated:  
We are extremely proud of the quality, balanced journalism 
that [the news station] produces. 
. . . .  
Unfortunately, some members of the media use their 
platforms to push their own personal bias and agenda to 
control ‘exactly what people think….’ This is extremely 
dangerous to a democracy.183 
When the segment aired on individual stations, viewers did not appear to 
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/business/media/sinclair-news-anchors-script.html.  
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246                          Concordia Law Review                               Vol. 5 
 
notice the forced script, but the video director at Deadspin weaved together a 
video clip that later went viral showing hundreds of anchors across the United 
States reading the words in unison.184 
Though that incident was the most publicized, Sinclair had required 
its broadcasters to air what the network deemed “must-runs” before.185 
According to a former newscaster for Sinclair, the segments “were a little 
slanted, a little biased. . . .Packages of this nature can make journalists 
uncomfortable.”186 Sinclair has required newscasters to include pre-approved 
content on stories ranging from terrorism to messages in support of President 
Trump.187  
But Sinclair’s must-runs include more than just commentary by 
newscasters decrying fake news. These short segments are received daily at 
television stations across the country, and newsrooms must air the segments 
within 24 to 48 hours.188 In one example, during the 2016 campaign, Sinclair 
mandated its local news stations air a must-run in which its anchors suggested 
voters not vote for Hillary Clinton because the Democratic Party was 
historically pro-slavery.189 Current and former reporters for Seattle KOMO 
broadcast station have also complained about Sinclair’s programming 
requirements and the use of mandated daily polls that the reporter’s described 
as asking “leading questions.”190   
Yet the allegations against Sinclair predate the 2016 election. In 2004, 
Sinclair Broadcast Group declared it would air a documentary on 62 of its 
stations weeks before the 2004 presidential campaign that criticized John 
Kerry’s record in Vietnam.191 Many of the local stations were in swing states 
and were instructed by Sinclair to air the broadcast.192 Kerry’s campaign 
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argued that airing the segment would invoke a right to equal time for Kerry 
to rebut the accusations made in the documentary.193 Moreover, Sinclair had 
instructed stations to preempt regular programming to air the report, which 
alleged that testimony by Kerry before Congress contributed to the torture of 
soldiers held in Vietnam.194 The allegations were unverified.  
Sinclair ultimately backed out of airing the documentary, but Reed 
Hundt, the former chair of the FCC, remarked, “If broadcasters start to behave 
to the degree [ ] Sinclair is uniquely behaving, the whole industry will find 
that they'll be on the short end of the political stick.”195 Sinclair’s behavior 
did not improve, however. Thirteen years later, Sinclair has amassed a larger 
market share and its behavior has become more brazen.196  
C. Attempts to Reinstate Regulations  
Efforts to prevent broadcasters from disseminating biased news or 
failing to verify facts before air are challenging because the FCC’s own 
guidelines provide that it “cannot interfere with a broadcaster’s selection and 
presentation of news or commentary,”197 but for some narrow areas in which 
the FCC has the regulatory authority to penalize licensees for knowingly 
broadcasting false information.198  
The FCC provides a consumer guide that identifies “rigging or 
slanting the news” as the “most heinous act against the public interest.”199 
Yet despite the complaint process in place, the FCC will not revoke a 
broadcaster’s license “unless the extrinsic evidence of possible deliberate 
distortion of staging of the news which is brought to our attention, involves 
the licensee, including its principals, top management or news 
management.”200 But as the instances of broadcast misinformation discussed 
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supra Part II.B. demonstrate, top management and news management are 
often unaware of reporting inaccuracies until after publication, and by then, 
it can be difficult to contain a false story. Or, as in the case of Sinclair, the 
information broadcast is not misinformation per se, but rather slanted or 
biased information that fails to provide consumers a balanced account of 
events.  
As a result, virtually since the abolishment of the Fairness Doctrine, 
legislators have sought to reimpose its regulations in some form on broadcast 
media. For example, in 2005, New York Representative Maurice Hinchey 
introduced legislation that would reinstate the Doctrine.201 The bill was 
deemed the “Hush Rush” bill, in reference to Rush Limbaugh.202 The year 
before, Senator Richard Durbin called for the Doctrine to be reinstated.203 
Then, when Barack Obama was elected, concern among conservative radio 
voices intensified that the Doctrine may actually be reinstated. The Center for 
Individual Freedom circulated fundraising alerts with the headline, “Hannity 
and Limbaugh to be kicked off the air.”204 Even so, the panic never came to 
fruition.  
But 2005 was not the first time Congress sought to revive the Fairness 
Doctrine. Immediately after the FCC eliminated the Doctrine in 1987, 
Congress attempted to codify its principles into law.205 The bill passed the 
House and the Senate but President Reagan vetoed it.206 A few years later, as 
Rush Limbaugh emerged as a conservative radio host, the bill passed the 
House again, but President George Bush threatened to veto the legislation.207  
Similar attempts to revive the legislation did not emerge until 1993 
with the hope that a democratic president, Bill Clinton, would usher in the 
regulations.208 By that time, Limbaugh had portrayed the bill as an “attempt 
by the United States Congress to legislate against [him] and talk radio 
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hosts.”209 Not only did Bill Clinton never revive the Fairness Doctrine, but 
he passed the Telecommunications Act, further deregulating the broadcast 
industry.210  
III. INDEPENDENT BROADCAST COUNCIL   
Though regulating broadcasters presents challenges, the current 
deregulated atmosphere weighs against allowing broadcast to exist in 
perpetuity without additional oversight. To combat fake news and restore the 
perception of public trust to the media, this Note proposes creating an 
Independent Broadcast Council (Council) to administer and monitor 
broadcast regulation, including a revised version of the Fairness Doctrine.  
Stated simply, the Council would operate under the guidance of the 
FCC as a voluntarily regulatory oversight committee in much the same 
format and function that the American Bar Association operates in its 
oversight of lawyers. That said, unlike the FCC, as an independent body, this 
Council would operate without political pressure to monitor broadcasters for 
compliance with revised regulations that seek to ensure fair and balanced 
coverage.  
This Part proposes that the Council would be structured under the 
framework of existing legislation that established the Public Broadcasting 
Act. The Council would operate under a charter adopted to implement the 
key tenets of the Fairness Doctrine. By incorporating both aspects of this 
proposal, this Note argues that revised broadcast regulations would be less 
susceptible to partisan influence and would increase public perception of the 
media, while its independent and voluntary nature would ensure that it 
remained within the confines of the First Amendment.  
Media regulation can occur in essentially one of two forms: self-
regulation or government regulation.211 This concept is, itself, somewhat 
misleading. There are various forms of regulation possible from complete 
state control to “consensus regulation.”212 Yet, unlike countries that have 
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proposed or implemented sweeping media regulations, United States citizens 
are protected under the First Amendment, limiting government intrusions on 
freedom of the press.213 Even so, a hybrid alternative may be possible. 
Enforced self-regulation of broadcast news would bring together a regulatory 
body of stakeholders; the government’s role would be to ensure enforcement 
of the self-imposed regulations under the FCC.214  
A. The Proposal 
This Subpart examines how reimplementing broadcast regulation 
should be administered, how the Fairness Doctrine should be updated, and 
how the United States can replicate the successful efforts of other countries 
in creating an independent agency to oversee broadcast news. Along the way, 
this Subpart elucidates the potential design that can keep broadcast regulation 
within the purview of the First Amendment while upholding the role of 
broadcasters as public trustees that was once envisioned under the Fairness 
Doctrine. 
1. Creating a Broadcast Council: The Framework   
The framework for an Independent Broadcast Council already exists 
under the legislation for the Public Broadcasting Act.215 Even so, the current 
Act encompasses solely public broadcasters. But it is, by itself, the product 
of nearly a century of congressional amendments and legislative change.216 
Given the congressional propensity to amend and expand this legislation, the 
Public Broadcasting Act can similarly be amended to expand the scope of the 
existing framework to encompass commercial broadcasters.  
Despite the flaws, the Public Broadcasting Act serves as a significant 
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first step in the effort to remedy the faults in America’s broadcast and its 
framework can be revised to incorporate the vision of restoring credibility to 
broadcast news. There are significant advantages to working within an 
existing piece of legislation rather than trying to create the Council under an 
entirely new regulatory scheme. First, the Public Broadcasting Act was 
passed in 1967.217 Second, in the more than 50 years since its passage, public 
broadcasters have adhered to the statutory mandate of “strict adherence to 
objectivity and balance” resulting in a high public trust of public television.218 
Third, if the United States were to codify aspects of the Fairness Doctrine in 
this legislation and expand the standards that organizations such as PBS and 
NPR voluntarily follow under the Act, the United States could implement the 
successful aspects of the Public Broadcasting Act while remaining within the 
confines of the First Amendment.  
2. The Structure  
Borrowing from both concepts of international broadcast regulatory 
authority and existing attempts in the United States to establish public 
broadcasting, the process of creating an Independent Broadcast Council 
would begin through legislation. An amendment to the Public Broadcasting 
Act could largely achieve these goals.  
In its current form, the Public Broadcasting Act states, in part: “it 
furthers the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services 
which will be responsive to the interests of people both in particular localities 
and throughout the United States, will constitute an expression of diversity 
and excellence. . . .”219 The governing body of the Corporation created under 
the Act consists of a Board of Directors, and the “term of each office of each 
member of the Board appointed by the President shall be 6 years. . . .”220 After 
presidential appointment, each member of the CPB must undergo Senate 
confirmation.221 Moreover, the Public Broadcasting Act established a 
Treasury fund that appropriated financial support for public broadcasting.222 
This structure presents both the potential to rectify some concerns and 
some immediate flaws. First, the political appointment process of board 
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members to the CPB creates the opportunity for partisan influence. By 
permitting presidential appointments, the organization is vulnerable to 
leadership that is sympathetic to partisan policy views. This potential would 
be magnified if the Corporation were expanded.223 On the other hand, public 
broadcasting is intended to serve the public interest. In many ways CPB has 
met this lofty ambition; for the 16th consecutive year, Americans rated PBS 
as the most trusted institution, above the court and legal system.224 
American’s perception of trust in public broadcasting is significantly higher 
than that of traditional broadcast,225 but to expand the Act, changes will have 
to occur.  
As such, the existing Public Broadcasting Act would function as both 
a springboard for amended legislation and an opportunity to improve 
legislation. Regardless of the specifics adopted, the broad features of any 
regulatory scheme imposed under the Council would include: (1) an 
organizational structure for the Council, (2) a funding mechanism, (3) 
mechanisms for implementing and enforcing decisions, (4) and 
accountability measures.226 
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3. How to Amend the Act 
This Subpart will first describe the process of amending the Public 
Broadcasting Act and then elucidate the reason for these steps.  
The process to amend the Public Broadcasting Act would work as 
follows: A bill would propose the amendment to the existing Public 
Broadcasting Act. Because the intended purpose of revised legislation would 
be to amend existing law, the proposed bill would clearly articulate its 
relation to the preexisting Public Broadcasting Act.227 To amend a law, a 
proposed bill may add, strike, or add and strike new text.228 The purpose of 
an amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act would likely be to both add 
and strike new text from the existing legislation.229 In so doing, the 
amendatory bill would identify the specific alterations in the existing law that 
it will modify.230 
Following the amended version of the bill, a comparative print 
between the revised version and the Public Broadcasting Act would be 
provided.231 According to House Rule XIII, clause 3(e)(1) (the Ramseyer 
Rule) and Senate Rule XXVI (the Cordon Rule), when a bill is reported out 
of committee that amends existing law, the committee must provide a 
comparative print that demonstrates how the amendment modifies existing 
law.232  
Next, the amended legislation would revise the corporate structure 
under the existing Public Broadcasting Act to eliminate the process of 
political appointees. The political appointment of board members serves to 
undermine public trust in the media rather than bolster it. Whether intentional 
or inadvertent, appointing political figures to the board who are subsequently 
responsible for programming decisions, can impact how news is covered and 
impact the objectivity of reporters.  
Instead, in the same manner that the existing Public Broadcasting Act 
established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting as a nonprofit entity, the 
board of directors under the Independent Broadcast Council should be 
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selected from stakeholders within broadcasting and confirmed by peers. This 
process would mirror the method by which the Act currently mandates only 
two members be selected: “[o]ne member shall be selected from among 
individuals who represent the licensees and permittees of public television 
stations, and one member shall be selected from among individuals who 
represent the licensees and permittees of public radio stations.”233  
The benefit to this change is two-fold. First, it eliminates the political 
appointment process. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it creates a 
vested interest in the success of the Council for stakeholders. Moreover, 
amended legislation would call for a board seat filled by a member of the 
public; a member that is selected from within the board to serve on a rotating 
basis that provides insight into the communities the media is meant to serve.  
With the corporate structure addressed, the amended Public 
Broadcasting Act would next add language from the Fairness Doctrine. This 
language would largely need to be revised to address First Amendment 
trepidations.  
For example, the Public Broadcasting Act currently states, “it is in the 
public interest to encourage the growth and development of public radio and 
television broadcasting, including the use of such media for instructional, 
educational, and cultural purposes. . . .”234 Amended legislation could be 
revised to include language that the broadcaster must make every effort to 
present contrasting views and inform the general public.235 Similarly, 
whereas the current legislation mandates that public broadcasting “furthers 
the general welfare to encourage public telecommunications services which 
will be responsive to the interests of people[,]” revised legislation may 
suggest that in so doing, licensees devote a reasonable portion of the 
broadcast to the discussion of issues of public importance.236 Lastly, current 
legislation mandates that public television “encourage the development of 
programming . . . and that addresses the needs of unserved and underserved 
audiences . . .”237 but revised legislation could expand this mandate to meet 
these goals for all audiences in an objective and transparent manner.238 This 
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serves two goals. First, it codifies the Fairness Doctrine, which, as the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals determined in TRAC v. FCC, had never occurred.239 
Second, it resolves the constitutionally suspect language that led the FCC to 
abandon the doctrine in the 1980s.240  
Subpart D, subsection (a) of the Public Broadcasting Act identifies 
ten congressional declarations of policy, including the establishment of the 
private Corporation.241 Revised legislation would create the entity known as 
the “Independent Broadcast Council,” replacing the existing Corporation for 
Public Broadcasting. The need to create a new entity under the Act arises 
under the nature of the revised legislation; the revised Act would greatly 
expand the purpose of the Public Broadcasting Act to encompass all 
broadcast media, not just public telecommunications. Revising the entity 
would clarify the role and the purpose of the Council and contrast it from the 
existing Corporation. Even so, nothing in the revised legislation should be 
interpreted to suggest that participation is mandated. The Council would 
function as a voluntary self-regulatory body.  
The organization would operate independent of, but in cooperation 
with, the FCC.242 The Council would also operate under a charter and code 
of ethics. Coordination between the Council and the FCC in the United States 
would be crucial.243 Most importantly, involving key media stakeholders in 
the Council significantly diminishes the likelihood of challenges to the 
regulatory framework.  
Such a proposed charter and code of integrity is not dissimilar to the 
current manner in which the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
functions.244 Yet the existing charter and code of integrity is largely targeted 
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D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has interpreted Section 398 of the Public Broadcasting Act as 
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toward public and educational broadcasting and would need to be revised to 
address the wider scope of the Act. As such, the standards of conduct and 
code of integrity implemented under the Independent Broadcast Council 
should be developed by the members of the Council and could be based on 
the existing codes. Nevertheless, the revised standards should, at a minimum, 
contain a commitment to fairness and accuracy in reporting.245 Once created, 
the Council would use the standards of conduct and code of integrity to create 
a rating system.  
4. Rating System  
The revised Public Broadcasting Act would call for a new rating 
system of broadcast news to help viewers assess the creditability of the 
coverage. The existing television rating system was put into place by 
Congress with the passage of the Telecommunications Act to allow parents 
to block objectionable content from children.246 This same concept and 
technology can be used objectively to assess the credibility of news coverage.  
The rating system would assign a numerical value to broadcast news 
stations and rate the station on a quarterly or semi-quarterly basis. The 
metrics for the rating could be based upon credibility, trustworthiness, 
objectivity, and the variety of stories covered. Though the individual 
components to the rating system would vary, it would likely be crucial to 
have a multi-factor rating system so as to not cause significant fluctuations in 
a station’s rating from one quarter to the next, but rather an objective metric 
that considered multiple factors. Moreover, much like the program content 
warning system that airs before a television program, this proposed system 
could warn viewers about news content with a history of providing unverified 
claims.  
                                                 
Ethics and Business Conduct for Employees of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 
CPB (April 21, 2010), https://www.cpb.org/files/board/governance/Governance_Policies_ 
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A rating system solves two problems. First, it remedies the issue of 
mandating broadcasters to participate in the Independent Broadcast Council. 
It does so because participation in the Council would be voluntary, but by 
electing not to follow the standards and code of ethics adopted under the 
Council, broadcasters would see a decline in the numerical value assigned 
through the rating system. Second, the rating system remedies the issue of 
rendering the Council ineffective through voluntary participation. 
Functioning under the same mechanism that the existing television rating 
system allows, a credibility rating system is merely one proposed regulation 
to combat fake news.  
B. How Regulations Combat Fake News  
Having clarified how the Council would be created and structured, 
this Subpart addresses how such a Council would work to combat fake news. 
Specifically, this Subpart shows how regulation would begin to restore 
credibility to the media.  
1. Defining the Problem 
There is no clear definition of the phrase fake news. As analyzed 
supra Part II, this contributes, in part, to the extent of the problem. Depending 
on the source, the definition ranges from information that is clearly false to 
information that is sensationalized. According to one dictionary, the term is 
defined as “false, often sensational, information disseminated under the guise 
of news reporting.”247 The term was popularized in 2016 when then-
presidential candidate Donald Trump began to use the term, but while Trump 
may have popularized the phrase, the concept existed long before he brought 
it into the mainstream.248  
By the end of the 2016 election cycle, when important stories began 
to percolate to the top of the news cycle regarding Russian interference in the 
campaign, a large swath of Americans had become largely disconnected from 
the news, finding it too polarizing.249 Even more were beginning to accept 
                                                 
247Fake News, COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/ 
dictionary/english/fake-news (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).  
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https://www.1843magazine.com/technology/rewind/the-true-history-of-fake-news. 
249 See Lee Raine, Scott Keeter & Andrew Perrin, Trust and Distrust in America, PEW RES. 
CTR. (July 22, 2019), https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-
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Trump’s characterization that the news was “fake.”250 President Trump has a 
propensity for using the term fake news to describe stories he finds 
unfavorable, but for his supporters, the term invokes feelings of media bias 
and unfairness.251  
Nevertheless, like Trump, what many people describe as fake news is 
merely less objective news or news with which they do not agree.252 What 
results from the latter is a cycle of seeking out information that confirms 
preexisting beliefs. “One of the biggest risks often imputed to the current 
media environment, in which audiences can pick and choose news outlets that 
agree with them, is that people will become more and more siloed, cutting 
themselves off from information that they don’t like or that contradicts their 
prior assumptions.”253  
More than 53 percent of respondents to a Pew study placed the blame 
for fake news squarely on the media.254 Even so, had the media been more 
regulated from the beginning, and the coverage been more balanced, perhaps 
consumers would have been more receptive to the coverage. Pew Research 
found that six in ten Democrats have dropped a media outlet over the 
perception that the outlet was covering fake news; up to 70 percent of 
Republicans have done the same.255  
Implementing the Independent Broadcast Council could define fake 
news and take proactive steps to address it, much like the French did ahead 
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of election interference in the French elections in November 2018.256 
Identifying the problem is the first step to addressing it; without a unified 
definition from which broadcasters can work to identify what fake news is, 
there is little to suggest that broadcasters can remedy the issue.257  
An Independent Broadcast Council cannot provide fair and objective 
reporting if no standard exists by which to measure objective reporting. The 
concept is quite nebulous. If this Council is to succeed, it can only do so under 
clear guidelines. Thus, though the phrase fake news is often used in scholarly 
articles to imply an intent to deceive or misinform,258 this Note uses the term 
to mean bias or unfair reporting, though such a definition would not preclude 
an intent to deceive. The reason for a broader definition is that any attempt to 
restore public trust of the media cannot begin by putting a standard in place 
that does not address the public’s concern.  
In fact, the disparity in the definition of fake news may contribute to 
the misinformation over how prolific the issue truly is. While some use the 
term to refer to inaccurate stories, others use the phrase to refer to unfavorable 
stories.259 Lack of uniformity in the definition contributes to misinformation 
and perpetuates the cycle. 
2. Creating a Process to Fix the Problem  
The Independent Broadcast Council could operate to manage 
complaints and oversee the objectivity of broadcasters under its purview. 
Such a process could operate as follows: A complaint or observation of 
inaccurate or biased reporting is brought to the attention of the Council.260 
The Council would then notify the station of the complaint in an attempt to 
resolve the complaint. If the offending station were to refuse to remedy the 
error, the Council would have the authority to notify the FCC which could 
result in a decrease to the station’s credibility rating. On the other hand, 
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should the station abide by the Council’s recommendation to remedy the 
issue, the station would be provided one of several choices to revise the story. 
For example, if the allegation involved bias, the station could remedy the 
issue by providing equal airtime to the issue on the opposing side. 
Conversely, if the complaint involved an allegation of misinformation, the 
station could air a correction.  
The primary benefit to the Council is that it establishes a dialogue 
between broadcasters and presents an opportunity for the station to refuse the 
recommendation of the Council but creates consequences for doing so, 
namely a negative consequence to the credibility rating of the station. Though 
the First Amendment would prohibit the agency from censoring a broadcast 
station, regulations could be adapted to fine the station, or to provide 
warnings to viewers that the information was unverified. More importantly, 
creating a unified definition and standard under which broadcasters operate 
would provide the public with a standard against which to hold the media 
accountable and likely aid in restoring public trust.  
C. Potential Applications for an Independent Broadcast Council 
Having established how the Independent Broadcast Council would 
function, this Subpart identifies how the Council would operate in a 
regulatory environment. Specifically, this Subpart shows how this Council 
would enable the media to regain credibility from the American public and 
combat allegations of fake news.  
The advantage to creating an Independent Broadcast Council under 
the umbrella of the FCC is that such co-regulation provides sufficient 
independence from the government, as is the case with the existing Public 
Broadcasting Act, while still providing regulatory oversight. Such enforced 
self-regulation retains the benefits of self-regulation while ensuring an 
effective operation of the system.261 Establishing an independent regulatory 
body would not only improve journalistic standards, but it would also 
increase transparency and provide the public with a mechanism through 
which to voice concerns about inaccurate and biased reporting. This proposal 
would also increase accountability. Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
previously demonstrated its openness to a variation of such regulation.262  
 To illustrate, consider how the Independent Broadcast Council would 
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have functioned in the examples discussed supra Part II.  
1. The Iraq War—Revisited  
First, given the process elucidated supra Part III.B.2, it is worth 
analyzing how the scheme would have functioned on coverage leading up to 
the Iraq war. The coverage analyzed supra was for a period of seven and a 
half months. Imagine a complaint was filed during that period. Alternatively, 
the Council itself could have observed inaccurate or biased reporting. 
Consider the process had a complaint been filed relating to the amount of 
airtime then-president George Bush received in support of the view that Iraq 
had WMD as opposed to the amount and quality of time the commentators 
received who spoke out against that view.  
Under the process identified, the next step would be for the Council 
to reach out to the station. For the coverage of Iraq, those stations were NBC, 
CBS, and ABC.263 Once the Council notified the station of the complaint, the 
station would have the opportunity to resolve the issue. Here, that would 
result in either providing more credible commentators to speak in opposition 
to the theory that Iraq had WMD (recall the primary opposition voice at the 
time was Suddam Hussein) or to provide an analysis of the opposing 
viewpoint from network commentators.  
The concept is not radical. Opposing viewpoints existed at the time 
from credible sources. Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy spoke in 
September 2002, stating, “[i]nformation from the intelligence community 
over the past six months does not point to Iraq as an imminent threat to the 
United States or a major proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.”264 The 
Chief United Nations weapons inspector, Hans Blix, said in 2003, “[t]he 
commission has not at any time during the inspection in Iraq found evidence 
of the continuation or resumption of programs of weapons of mass 
destruction or significant quantities of proscribed items, whether from pre-
1991 or later.”265  
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The purpose of the Independent Broadcast Council in a situation such 
as the one described above is not to suggest that had it existed, the United 
States would not have relied on false intelligence. Rather, it is to suggest that 
it could have created a dialogue between broadcasters and the public sooner 
or shined a light on what was occurring. Years later, as the full extent of the 
media operation to sway public opinion in favor of a war became clear, 
journalists who unknowingly participated expressed regret. Kenneth Allard, 
a former NBC military analyst recalled, “I felt we’d been hosed.”266  
“Internal Pentagon documents repeatedly refer[ed] to the military 
analysts [who the networks booked as commentators] as ‘message force 
multipliers’ or ‘surrogates’ who could be counted on to deliver administration 
‘themes and messages’ to millions of Americans ‘in the form of their own 
opinions.’”267 It is difficult to hypothesize whether an Independent Broadcast 
Council could have remedied the mass media failure that contributed to the 
disinformation of the Iraq war, but it would have acted as a final arbiter 
between broadcasters and the public and could have aided in providing a 
more balanced approach to the coverage. More importantly, it could have 
provided the public the opportunity to weigh both sides of the issue for and 
against military action—an opportunity the public was denied.  
2. Seth Rich—Revisited  
Second, the conspiracy that arose from Seth Rich’s murder presents 
another example for how an Independent Broadcast Council would function, 
yet it does so in a drastically divergent manner than the preceding scenario. 
Here, when Fox 5 published the story, the credibility of it was not 
immediately clear.268 The environment in place at the broadcasting network 
when this story aired was not conducive to preventing the publication of 
disinformation. According to the complaint filed after the broadcast: 
“Revelations about Fox News' role in concocting a baseless story on the death 
of a young Democratic staffer has problematic echoes for the network’s 
controlling owner . . .”269 This type of disinformation spreads quickly, as 
evidenced by the speed at which the Seth Rich story circulated after its 
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publication on Fox 5.270  
Under the framework identified before, in a case of disinformation 
the Independent Broadcast Council could have reached out to Fox 5 that day 
and requested a retraction. If Fox 5 refused, the Council would have 
alternatives available that may have limited the reach of the story and the 
impact on the Rich family.  
First, other member organizations of the Council could have clarified 
the story.271 It is worth noting that this may not be an ideal solution to slow 
the spread of disinformation, however. An effort to clarify a false story by 
other networks could inadvertently bring more attention to the story, thus 
increasing the speed with which it circulates. Alternatively, the Council could 
notify the FCC. Under the proposed rating system, the FCC would have the 
ability to reduce the station’s rating, signaling to viewers that the station’s 
credibility is diminished. For the station to improve its rating, it would have 
to demonstrate to the Council that it had published a retraction of the story 
and that a period of time had elapsed without similar untruthful reporting.  
Of note, had standards been in place, adopted under a charter of ethics 
and code of conduct that members of the Council agreed to abide by, 
including individual broadcast stations, it may have prevented this 
journalistic malpractice from occurring. Even so, assuming arguendo that the 
existence of a Council could not have prevented the publication of this story, 
it may have limited its impact.  
It is also worth noting that, though the process identified here would 
require the Council to notify the FCC of proposed violations of the charter, 
this does not negate the need or value of the Council as an oversight body. 
The FCC has jurisdiction over all interstate and international communications 
by radio, television, cable, and satellite.272 As such, the FCC cannot manage 
the content on individual local stations, but an Independent Council, centered 
in the individual communities it served, likely could.  
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3. Sinclair Broadcast Group—Revisited  
Finally, the circumstances involving Sinclair Broadcast Group 
present yet another hypothetical by which to examine the effectiveness of an 
Independent Broadcast Council. Unlike both of the stories addressed supra, 
Sinclair is demonstrable of a network that has shifted its reporting style away 
from objectivity, rather than a single story or group of stories that lack 
objectivity. Even so, such a circumstance can be illustrative for how the 
Council would operate. Imagine that, given the size of Sinclair Broadcast 
Group and its significant influence, it elected not to participate in the 
Independent Broadcast Council. In several ways, such a decision would not 
significantly diminish the effect of the proposed Council.  
First, because the proposed Council operates under the FCC, it would 
assume much of the regulatory oversight of the FCC. Second, despite the size 
of Sinclair, it still operates at a market share of roughly 39 percent.273 This is 
because, under the FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, a station group cannot 
reach more than 39 percent of all U.S. households.274 As such, other station 
groups would comprise the remaining 61 percent of the market.275  
This is relevant to the effectiveness of the Council for several 
reasons. Once implemented, stations that elect not to participate in the 
Council would have a lower credibility rating than those that voluntarily 
participate. This would stem from oversight and cooperation with the Council 
and adherence to standards to provide credible and accurate reporting. 
Though the Council cannot mandate participation, the net effect is a warning 
to consumers that the information they receive from a network that elects not 
to participate in the Council has not been verified or authenticated.  
Though Sinclair Broadcast Group could elect not to participate in the 
Council or abide by the standards the Council adopts, the purpose of the 
Council would remain intact. The objective of the Council’s framework is to 
provide the public a unified standard against which to measure the objectivity 
and credibility of broadcast news. Above all else, because the proposed 
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standards largely function within existing law, the courts would likely uphold 
the standards as constitutional.  
D. Reconciling the Law  
Commentators opposed to reinstating regulation on broadcasters, 
particularly a reiteration of the Fairness Doctrine, maintain that the regulation 
had a chilling effect on the First Amendment.276 The FCC itself raised this 
concern in its 1985 Fairness Report.277 For several reasons, this argument 
does not stand as an immobile obstacle to re-implementing any reiteration of 
the Fairness Doctrine on broadcasters. First, in Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Fairness 
Doctrine.278 The Court held that free speech was “the right of the viewers and 
the listeners, not the right of the broadcasters.”279 Second, the Doctrine never 
mandated what broadcaster covered. Instead, it required broadcasters to 
provide balanced coverage of controversial issues. Moreover, the Supreme 
Court differentiated broadcast on the basis of its licensing requirements; 
because the FCC licensed broadcasters, the Court determined it did not 
present a First Amendment issue: 
It does not violate the First Amendment to treat licensees 
given the privilege of using scarce radio frequencies as 
proxies for the entire community, obligated to give suitable 
time and attention to matters of great public concern. To 
condition the granting or renewal of licenses on a willingness 
to present representative community views on controversial 
issues is consistent with the ends and purposes of those 
constitutional provisions forbidding the abridgment of 
freedom of speech and freedom of the press.280 
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This nuance is often overlooked, but it is an important facet of the original 
Fairness Doctrine that speaks to the constitutionality of the legislation. Even 
so, following the Red Lion decision, discussed supra Part I, several appellate 
court cases challenged the doctrine on First Amendment grounds.281  
It is likely that if the Doctrine were resurrected in its prior form, 
opponents to the legislation would immediately mount a court challenge. In 
part, this would be justified. The Doctrine was drafted by the FCC in 1949, 
barely a decade after the FCC itself emerged.282 Television broadcast was in 
its infancy and not much was understood about the concept of the radio 
spectrum.283 As such, the rationale behind reinstating a version of the 
Fairness Doctrine today is not supported by the scarcity rationale that the 
Supreme Court used to justify upholding the Doctrine in 1969; instead, the 
rationale is supported by a recognition that the Fairness Doctrine helped 
preserve civility in broadcast journalism and created an ethical standard for 
the public to hold broadcasters to. It would be this standard—the concept that 
broadcasters were intended to serve as public trustees—coupled with the 
voluntary nature of the Independent Broadcast Counsel, which would likely 
withstand revised regulations.  
In a broader context, even considering the extensive proposal made, 
it is unlikely that an Independent Broadcast Council would run afoul of the 
First Amendment. Rather, the Supreme Court would likely uphold such 
legislation. Consider FCC v. League of Women Voters of California in which 
the Supreme Court examined the First Amendment implications of the Public 
Broadcasting Act.284  
In its original iteration, section 399 of the Act prohibited 
editorializing on public broadcasting stations.285 In asserting this argument 
before the Court, the government maintained that such a ban on public 
broadcasting networks was necessary to protect educational broadcasting 
from coercion from becoming the target of government propaganda as a 
result of federal financing.286 Unlike the Court’s decision in Red Lion which 
upheld editorializing, section 399 prohibited broadcasters from addressing 
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issues of public importance, irrespective of whether it was done in a fair and 
balanced way.287  
The Court determined that section 399’s ban on editorializing 
exceeded what was necessary to protect public broadcasting from coercion 
by government influence.288 The government also argued that section 399 
prevented public broadcasting stations from becoming “a privileged outlet 
for the political and ideological opinions of station owners and managers . . . 
.”289 Even so, the Court was unconvinced. The Court invoked the 
requirements of the Fairness Doctrine as a regulatory mechanism to ensure 
that public broadcast would remain fair and balanced, reasoning:  
[T]he public's interest in preventing public broadcasting 
stations from becoming forums for lopsided presentations of 
narrow partisan positions is already secured by a variety of 
other regulatory means that intrude far less drastically upon 
the journalistic freedom of noncommercial broadcasters. The 
requirements of the FCC's fairness doctrine, for instance, 
which apply to commercial and noncommercial stations alike, 
ensure that such editorializing would maintain a reasonably 
balanced and fair presentation of controversial issues.290 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that its holding in Red Lion contemplated the 
same justification argued by the government:  
The solution to this problem offered by § 399, however, is 
precisely the opposite of the remedy prescribed by the FCC 
and endorsed by the Court in Red Lion. Rather than requiring 
noncommercial broadcasters who express editorial opinions 
on controversial subjects to permit more speech on such 
subjects to ensure that the public's First Amendment interest 
in receiving a balanced account of the issue is met, § 399 
simply silences all editorial speech by such broadcasters. 
Since the breadth of § 399 extends so far beyond what is 
necessary to accomplish the goals identified by the 
Government, it fails to satisfy the First Amendment standards 
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that we have applied in this area.291 
The Court held that there was no reason to deny public broadcasters the right 
to speak on issues of public concern.292 Unfortunately, the principle of the 
Fairness Doctrine that the Court assumed would protect public broadcasting 
was abandoned by the FCC within five years of the ruling in League of 
Women Voters.293  
The holding of this case is important for several reasons, but namely 
because of the Court’s treatment of Red Lion. League of Women Voters came 
before the Court 15 years after Red Lion. The Court had the opportunity to 
distinguish public broadcasting from commercial broadcasting or to separate 
the principles of the Fairness Doctrine from broadcasters that receive public 
funding, but it elected not to do so, instead embracing the Doctrine as a 
“guard against one-sided presentation of controversial issues . . . .”294 In so 
doing, the Court demonstrated that it is possible, if not likely, that the Public 
Broadcasting Act could be amended to encompass not only the guiding 
principles of the Fairness Doctrine, but also broadened to include commercial 
broadcasters, having found that the same regulations apply equally to both.  
Along similar lines, consider the more recent case of Serafyn v. 
FCC.295 This case is of particular interest because it originates out of the D.C. 
Circuit—the court that was instrumental in providing the FCC its rationale in 
abandoning the Fairness Doctrine.296 In Serafyn, the petitioner requested the 
FCC deny CBS a license renewal after the station aired a news segment that 
the petitioner alleged “intentionally distorted the situation in Ukraine by 
claiming that most Ukrainians are anti-Semitic.”297 In recounting the policy 
outlined by the FCC during the 1960s, the court quoted the FCC as stating: 
“[I]f the allegations of staging. . . simply involve news employees of the 
station, we will, in appropriate cases. . . inquire into the matter, but unless our 
investigation reveals involvement of the licensee or its management there will 
be no hazard to the station's licensed status. . . .”298 
 The segment at issue in Serafyn involved a piece called “The Ugly 
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Face of Freedom,” that aired on 60 Minutes. The broadcast suggested that 
Ukraine had a negative view toward Jews.299 After the broadcast, CBS 
received letters from Ukrainian-Americans expressing their anger over the 
broadcast, including one which suggested it was “unbalanced” and “did not 
convey the true state of affairs in Ukraine.”300 CBS argued that it would not 
investigate because any such investigation would “offend[] the protections of 
a free press.” As a result, the FCC determined that the incident did “not satisfy 
the standard for demonstrating intent to distort,” and that the petitioner had 
failed to demonstrate that CBS did not meet its public interest obligation.301 
Before the court of appeals, the petitioner argued that:  
[T]he Commission has never articulated a precise definition 
of extrinsic evidence and that its prior decisions suggest it is 
merely seeking objective evidence from outside the broadcast 
which demonstrates, without any need for the Commission to 
second-guess a licensee’s journalistic judgement or for the 
Commission to make credibility findings, that the licensee has 
distorted a news program.302 
The court determined that the FCC made several errors that contravened its 
own policy, including that it required the petitioner to demonstrate evidence 
that CBS had engaged in a pattern of distortion, despite its policy requiring a 
complainant meet a lower threshold.303 The court raised particular concern 
with the evidence of factual inaccuracies raised by the petitioner and 
disregarded by the FCC.304 The petitioner argued that CBS misrepresented 
facts to the extent that its decision to broadcast portions of the segment 
suggests it intentionally distorted the news.305 The court concluded that the 
FCC acted arbitrarily in denying the petitioner’s request to revoke CBS’s 
license, but did determine that CBS had not made a material 
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misrepresentation to the FCC.  
Yet this case shows not only the benefit of having an Independent 
Broadcast Council but also the court’s willingness to accept the oversight. 
The court’s concern here was centered on the FCC’s failure to oversee CBS, 
despite CBS’s claim that such oversight would impede its First Amendment 
protections. Moreover, though the FCC possessed the regulatory power to 
revoke CBS’s license following these complaints, it simply elected not to. An 
Independent Council could more consistently work with the complaints of 
the public to increase oversight over broadcasters and manage these exact 
issues.  
E. Successful Regulatory Schemes in Europe    
Those who oppose the reinstatement of regulations on the media 
maintain that it infringes on First Amendment protections and the freedom of 
the press.306 Yet some of the most stringent regulations on the media exist in 
European countries that protect the freedom of the press. Even so, legislation 
to regulate fake news in Europe has rightly garnered concerns from the world 
press and human rights activists concerning free speech and press 
freedoms.307 European countries are cognizant of balancing a citizen’s right 
to be informed with a citizen’s right to be accurately informed. Following a 
wave of nationalist elections and referendums in which disinformation played 
a large role, Europe is looking for a balance between free speech and 
objective reporting.308  
Perhaps no greater contrast exists against the backdrop of the 2016 
presidential election in which disinformation was so prevalent than in France 
where similar efforts failed. Following the United States’ 2016 presidential 
election that Russia successfully infiltrated, then-French presidential 
candidate Emmanuel Macron became the target of Russian disinformation. 
However, unlike the United States, the structure of French media made it less 
susceptible to Russian inference. Like presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, 
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Russia targeted Macron’s emails ahead of the French election and intended 
for a mass release.309 For two reasons, the emails did not gain traction in 
France in the same manner the release of Clinton’s emails gained national 
attention in the United States. First, French electoral laws prohibit media 
outlets from news coverage of political candidates for forty-four hours ahead 
of the election.310 Second, the media voluntarily abided by a request from the 
Macron campaign team the night the emails were hacked not to report on the 
content of the emails.311 Moreover, some traditional broadcasters denounced 
the Russian efforts and called upon their viewers not to allow themselves to 
be manipulated.312  
Contrast this with the response of broadcast news in the United States 
after the release of Hillary Clinton’s emails. A study by the Columbia 
Journalism Review found that “the various Clinton-related email scandals—
her use of a private email server while secretary of state, as well as the DNC 
and John Podesta hacks—accounted for more sentences than all of Trump’s 
scandals combined (65,000 vs. 40,000). . . .”313 More disconcerting, the study 
concluded, “these 65,000 sentences were written not by Russian hackers, but 
overwhelmingly by professional journalists employed at mainstream news 
organizations. . . .”314  
At first blush, it may appear the dissimilarities between French and 
American media stem from ethics, not regulation. Put another way, American 
media sources could have voluntarily elected not to devote 65,000 sentences 
to Hilary Clinton’s email scandals which perhaps would have contributed 
positively to Americans’ perception of the media. Even so, this oversimplifies 
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broadcasting priorities on the networks, particularly those owned by large 
conglomerates such as Sinclair that mandate coverage to the local stations. 
While the United States has slashed regulation on the media in the last 30 
years, France has upheld regulations on public broadcasters.315 These 
regulations were passed following its prior success in combating Russian 
disinformation.316  
In November 2018, under the initiative of French President Macron, 
France passed a law that defined the term fake news. The regulation defined 
the term as “[i]nexact allegations or imputations, or news that falsely report 
facts, with the aim of changing the sincerity of a vote.”317 A second part of 
the law mandates that social media establish a tool for users to flag 
disinformation.318 Moreover, the new legislation allows the Higher 
Audiovisual Council, the French broadcast regulator, to revoke the broadcast 
rights of television and radio stations found to be disseminating 
misinformation.319  
After Macron was elected, despite efforts by the Russian government 
to elect his opponent, the French government issued a 200 page report 
concerning the danger of information manipulation aimed at informing other 
countries what it had learned as a result of Russian interference.320 One 
striking conclusion was that “[o]ne of the reasons why the Macron Leaks 
failed to have an effect on the 2017 French presidential elections . . . is that 
the French media ecosystem is relatively healthy.”321 The report also found 
that “distrust in institutions was one of the main reasons for the rise and 
effectiveness of attempts at information manipulation.”322 In determining 
why the Russian disinformation campaign failed in France but succeeded in 
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the United States, the report posited “[c]ompared with other countries, 
especially the US and the UK, France presents a less vulnerable [ ] media 
environment for a number of reasons.”323 One reason may be that public trust 
of French media is high, a trust in which regulations, among other factors, 
play a role.  
 Perhaps no country is more cognizant of the affect disinformation can 
have on its citizens than Germany.324 Under the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, codified after World War II, German citizens and press 
are guaranteed “the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in 
speech, writing and pictures . . . .”325 The decision to protect freedom of the 
press was born out of the atrocities of World War II.326 With the protections 
of the press and freedom of speech, Germany has also determined a 
fundamental need exists to guarantee diversity in mass media.327  
 Article 41 of the Treaty governs the programming principles of 
broadcasters, and it mandates that broadcasters must “respect human dignity 
as well as the moral, religious and ideological beliefs of others. They should 
promote social cohesion in unified Germany and international understanding 
and should work toward a non-discriminatory society.”328 Article 56 
mandates: “Providers of telemedia including journalistic edited offers . . . are 
required to include in their offers without delay the reply of the person or 
institution who is affected by an assertion of fact made in their offer at no 
cost to the person affected.”329 
 In Canada, under the Broadcasting Act, the broadcasting system 
should “serve to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social 
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and economic fabric of Canada.”330  Canada requires that any station licensed 
to broadcast must “provide a reasonable opportunity for the public to be 
exposed to the expression of differing views on matter of public concern.”331 
This language in the Canadian Broadcasting Act is strikingly similar to what 
the United States’ Fairness Doctrine once required of broadcasters: “to 
provide a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting 
viewpoints on such issues.”332 Moreover, the Canadian Broadcasting Act 
requires that the broadcasting system “shall be effectively owned and 
controlled by Canadians;” enacted to enhance local content on Canadian 
broadcasting.333  
Conversely, the absence of local content rules in the United States 
means that large media conglomerates, like Sinclair Broadcasting Group, can 
mandate national coverage in the local market. The Fairness Doctrine 
required broadcast licensees to “provide coverage of vitally important 
controversial issues of interest in the community served by the licensees . . . 
.”334 However, each “must-run” that Sinclair mandates its local stations air 
focusing on national issues reduces the time the station has available to 
devote to local issues. 
Yet one country stands above the rest in terms of public trust in the 
media. Denmark, regulated by the Press Council, was polled as the most 
transparent country in terms of distinguishing fact from fiction in 
reporting.335 Denmark enjoys freedom of speech, guaranteed under Section 
77 of its constitution.336 Not unlike the United States, legal liability exists for 
libel, but the Danish press largely operates independent from government 
oversight.337 The Danish media in broadcast, print, and online are regulated 
under the Danish Press Council; members are appointed by the Supreme 
                                                 
330 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c 11 (Can.). 
331 Id.  
332 In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910, 102 F.C.C.2d REP. 143, 146 (1985). 
333 Broadcasting Act, S.C. 1991, c 11 (Can.). 
334 In re Inquiry into Section 73.1910, 102 F.C.C.2d REP. at 146 . 
335 Nic Newman & Richard Fletcher, Bias, Bullshit and Lies: Audience Perspectives on Low 
Trust in the Media, DIGITAL NEWS PROJECT (2017), https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/ 
sites/default/files/2017-11/Nic%20Newman%20and%20Richard%20Fletcher%20%20Bias 
%2C%20Bullshit%20and%20Lies%20-%20Report.pdf. 
336 Denmark, FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/ 
denmark (last visited Mar. 7, 2020). 
337 Id. 
2020                              FROM FAIRNESS TO FAKE NEWS                                275 
 
Court and journalist association.338 Participation in the Council is mandatory 
and if a journalist is found by the Council to have committed an ethical 
violation, the journalist can be sentenced to a fine or jail, though such 
sanctions are rare.339  
In each country, freedom of the press is guaranteed but regulations 
protect the public from disinformation and fake news. Regulating broadcast 
news in the United States could have similar results while remaining within 
the confines of the First Amendment.  
CONCLUSION 
 Broadcast news can inform the public, but it also can spread 
disinformation. Under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters once served as 
“public trustees” charged with providing fair and objective news to 
consumers. Yet deregulation led to a steep decline in public trust of 
broadcasters. An Independent Broadcast Council could provide the solution. 
An amendment to the Public Broadcasting Act could expand its scope to 
encompass a voluntary regulatory council tasked with upholding the 
standards of fairness and accuracy in broadcast. The media’s role is to inform, 
but it cannot do so without credibility. An Independent Broadcast Council 
would serve as an initial step toward restoring public perception of the media, 
and the framework exists to implement it.  
European countries have adopted legislation to combat fake news and 
address the “public trustee” component of broadcast news. The United States 
can follow the same approach and do so within existing law. Despite 
objections that regulating broadcasters would run afoul of the First 
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has long held that free speech 
is the right of listeners, not broadcasters. Broadcasters have long had a duty 
to serve as “public trustees.” Yet the question remains whether broadcasters 
will choose to fulfil that duty or allow it to remain a relic of history.    
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